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Abstract
There are two competing theoretical frameworks with which 
cognitive science examines how people reason. These 
frameworks are broadly categorized into logic and 
probability. This paper reports two applied experiments to test 
which framework explains better how people reason about 
evidence in criminal cases. Logical frameworks predict that 
people derive conclusions from the presented evidence to 
endorse an absolute value of certainty such as ‘guilty’ or ‘not 
guilty’ (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1999). But probabilistic 
frameworks predict that people derive conclusions from the 
presented evidence in order that they may use knowledge of 
prior instances to endorse a conclusion of guilt which varies
in certainty (e.g., Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006).  
Experiment 1 showed that reasoning about evidence of prior 
instances, such as disclosed prior convictions, affected 
participants’ underlying ratings of guilt. Participants’ guilt 
ratings increased in certainty according to the number of 
disclosed prior convictions. Experiment 2 showed that 
participants’ reasoning about evidence of prior convictions 
and some forensic evidence tended to lead participants to 
endorse biased ‘guilty’ verdicts when rationally the evidence 
does not prove guilt. Both results are predicted by 
probabilistic frameworks. The paper considers the
implications for logical and probabilistic frameworks of 
cognitive science for real world reasoning.
Keywords: Logic; Probability; Prior convictions; Criminal 
evidence; Legal reasoning.
Reasoning about Evidence in the Real World
Much of everyday life presents people with circumstances
that require speculation. Speculations in each case may lead 
to the generation of explanations called hypotheses (e.g., 
Evans, Over, & Handley, 2002). But it is only by checking 
if hypotheses reflect the encountered evidence that leads to a 
true understanding (e.g., Klayman & Ha, 1987). For 
example, people can reason about evidence in relation to 
questions which they find curious for their own sake, such 
as trying to discover why their dog tries to eat bees when he 
knows they sting, or a young child may try to discover if a 
kiss will turn a frog into a prince (e.g., Cowley, 2006). 
People can also reason about evidence in relation to 
progressive questions, such as how to generate 
environmentally friendly energy sources (e.g., Kuhn, 1996).  
And sometimes there are sensitive contexts in the real world 
in which people reason about evidence out of duty to 
society, such as ascertaining guilt and responsibility when 
on a jury (e.g., Loftus; 1996; Pennington & Hastie, 1981).
It is this latter example of reasoning about criminal evidence 
which is of concern in this paper. Consider that jury 
decision making studies have shown that the verdict thought 
about by the majority at the first ballot was the jury’s final 
verdict in at least 90% of trials (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; 
cited in Devine et al., 2001). What sorts of reasoning 
processes could lead to such effects and how can the effects 
be theoretically explained? One key example of a factor that 
may affect the consistency of this deliberation process is eye 
witness evidence (e.g., Loftus, 1975). People tend to believe 
a defendant is guilty especially if the eye-witness is 
confident (e.g., Loftus, 1996). Despite a person’s 
confidence, eye-witness memory has shown to be malleable 
and prone to several sorts of errors, including the 
misinformation effect in which subsequent false information 
can be added to the initial memory (Loftus, 1996). This 
applied research on eye-witness memory error has played a 
crucial role in the theoretical debate about the reconstructive 
nature of memory (see Loftus 2003 for a review). The 
purpose of this paper is similar in that it intends to
investigate an applied legal context in which it is important 
to understand how people may be prone to errors in real 
world reasoning, and to theoretically explain those errors 
(e.g., Genn, Partington, & Wheeler, 2006).
One context in which it is becoming increasingly 
important to theoretically explain people’s reasoning is 
criminal cases of child abuse (Sedlak et al., 2006). This 
paper intends to examine whether the evidence of a 
defendant’s prior convictions for similar offences should be 
disclosed in judicial proceedings (e.g., Petrosino & 
Petrosino, 1999), and whether such disclosure would bias 
people’s reasoning with subsequent evidence. To illustrate 
the serious manner in which evidence of a prior conviction
may affect people’s reasoning about a given case, consider 
the following sensitive real world example:
Megan Kanka was killed by Jesse Timmendequas, a 
released sex offender, who unknown to her parents, lived 
nearby.  An enormous public outcry led to emergency 
legislation in New Jersey requiring that every sex offender 
with a prior conviction be subject to a mandatory 
community notification system. Within several years the 
remaining 49 states brought in Megan’s Law.
(from Pawson, 2006).
The effects of disclosing information about prior 
conviction evidence on people’s reasoning is evident by
how quickly Megan’s Law was endorsed by the 50 states 
(for a review see Pawson, 2006). However, the US sex 
offender registration and community notification programs 
remain emotionally charged and contested areas of public 
policy (e.g., Matson & Lieb, 1996). The debate rests on 
whether policies such as Megan’s Law can serve the balance
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of protecting potential victims, while not leading to the 
conviction of potential innocent defendants who happen to 
have a prior conviction. Thus this paper has two specific
goals: (i) to investigate whether this balance can be 
preserved in two experiments that examine the effects of 
reasoning with prior convictions as evidence (in criminal 
cases of child abuse adapted from a real world case), and (ii) 
to investigate whether these effects can inform the debate 
about whether logical or probabilistic frameworks of 
cognitive science are more or less appropriate for explaining 
human cognition.
Applying Logical and Probabilistic 
Frameworks to Real World Reasoning
To predict how prior conviction evidence may affect how 
people reason about criminal evidence, it is necessary to
outline the main theoretical frameworks used to examine
how people think. There are presently two competing 
frameworks with which cognitive science tends to examine 
human cognition; including how people reason. More 
generally these frameworks have tended to relate to the 
dissociation between logicist accounts that value the 
investigation of symbol manipulation at the computational 
level (e.g., Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988); and connectionist 
accounts that value the investigation of  probabilistic 
implementations of activation at the neural network level 
(e.g., McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986). In psychological 
theories of reasoning these frameworks may be broadly 
categorized as logical frameworks of reasoning (e.g., 
Johnson-Laird, 1999) and probabilistic frameworks of 
reasoning (e.g., Chater, Tenenbaum, & Yuille, 2006; 
Griffiths & Tenenbaum, in press; Evans, Over, & Handley, 
2002).
Certainty and Uncertainty
Logical frameworks predict that people draw conclusions 
from the presented evidence to endorse an absolute value of 
certainty, such as ‘true’ or ‘false’ (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 
1999), or in the case of reasoning about criminal evidence 
‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’. The prediction that people will 
reason about presented evidence and draw conclusions of an 
absolute value of ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’ may be partially the
legacy of the foundations of contemporary theories of 
reasoning.
For example, the mental models theory in the psychology 
of reasoning suggests that people’s deduction involves the 
consideration of mental representations (mental models) of 
possibilities in the world considered to be true (e.g., 
Johnson-Laird, 1999). For example, the conditional 
statement ‘If Justina is in Dublin, then James is in Belfast’ 
(if p then q) is called Modus Ponens, and is derived from the 
logic of the propositional calculus (for a review see 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). When people are told 
‘Justina is in Dublin’, people may consider this statement to 
be true and mentally represent the possibility that ‘Justina is 
in Dublin’, and conclude that ‘James is in Belfast’. What is 
critical is that they are predicted to come to this conclusion 
with certainty.
What about uncertain contexts in which we cannot assume 
that a piece of information is absolutely true? There has 
been concern that reasoning theories built from logical 
frameworks, such as the propositional calculus, may not be 
able to fully account for reasoning in uncertain contexts, 
such as judicial settings, where it is not always possible to 
reach a conclusion that is certainly true or false (e.g., 
Oaksford & Chater, 2003). Some researchers believe that 
there is a probabilistic revolution taking place, especially 
when we consider the uncertainty with which people have 
traditionally been considered to reason with in real world 
decision making (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). 
For example, there has been the suggestion that people 
may in fact represent the subjective probability of a 
conditional statement (e.g., Evans et al., 2002). Consider the
statement ‘If David is left-handed, then he is guilty of the 
crime’. People may consider the possibility ‘If David is left-
handed’ (if p), which can be hypothetically added to a 
person’s prior knowledge so that they consider the 
possibility that ‘he is guilty of the crime’ (then q). They may 
actually consider the possibility of guilt given that David is 
left-handed (P(q|p)), and they can conclude with varying 
degrees of certainty that David is guilty. They may, for 
example, think about the possibility of other people being 
left-handed. 
Probabilities in reasoning research more readily refer to 
degrees of belief, which are subjective to an individual, 
rather than the mathematician’s frequentist interpretation of 
probability (e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 2003). For example, if 
a coin were tossed and landed beneath a table, a person’s 
degree of belief that the coin has landed heads may be 
different to the mathematician’s .5 frequentist interpretation. 
As the person’s visual contact with the coin gets closer their 
degree of belief may come closer to 1, as the visual cues 
communicate that it is increasingly likely that the coin has 
come up heads (Chater et al., 2006).  Analogous to this 
example is how a person’s degree of belief may increase 
along a continuum of guilt in a criminal case as they 
encounter more evidence indicative of guilt. But whereas 
probabilistic frameworks predict that the degree of belief in 
guilt may fluctuate between 0 and 1, logical frameworks 
predict that belief in guilt can be assigned an absolute value 
of ‘not guilty’ or ‘guilty’ corresponding to 0 and 1
respectively, and not to any value in-between (e.g., 
Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006). Thus probabilistic 
frameworks predict that people draw conclusions from 
presented evidence by adding it to their prior knowledge. 
That is, when people consider evidence such as prior 
instances in the real world, they may not only endorse a 
conclusion of guilt which varies in certainty, but they may 
be biased in their consideration of subsequent evidence 
relevant to a case.  
The paper examines if predictions derived from 
probabilistic frameworks of reasoning can explain how 
people reason with evidence of prior convictions in a 
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criminal case (adapted from a real life example). 
Experiment 1 investigates whether the consideration of prior 
instances, such as prior convictions, may lead to conclusions 
varying in certainty such as ‘more or less guilty’ rather than 
lead to conclusions of absolute certainty such as ‘guilty’ or 
‘not guilty’. Experiment 2 investigates whether the 
consideration of prior convictions could bias the
consideration of subsequent evidence relevant to a case. See 
Table 1 below for a comparison of predictions between 
logical and probabilistic frameworks relevant to the 
experiments that follow:
Table 1: Predictions made by Logical and Probabilistic 
Frameworks when people reason with prior convictions in 
real world criminal cases.
Logic Probability
1. The endorsement 
of absolute values
such as ‘Not guilty’
The endorsement of 
uncertain values such 
as ‘Cannot decide’
2. Underlying ratings 
of guilt should not 
increase towards 
‘guilty’ as prior 
convictions are 
disclosed.
Underlying ratings of 
guilt should increase 
towards ‘guilty’ as 
prior convictions are 
disclosed.
3. The consideration 
of prior convictions 
should not bias 
reasoning about 
subsequent evidence.
The consideration of 
prior convictions 
should bias reasoning 
about subsequent 
evidence.
Prescriptive and Descriptive Considerations It is 
important to note the distinction between prescriptive and 
descriptive predictions of both frameworks in light of the 
following experiments. This distinction is relevant to the 
question of prior convictions, because logically a prior 
conviction could be viewed as a coincidence that could be
‘an accidental correspondence between independent facts’ 
(Horwich, 1982; p. 104; cited Griffiths & Tenenbaum, in 
press). On the one hand logic prescribes that evidence must 
be logically related to the facts of a present case in order for 
it to be considered rational to consider (e.g., Roberts & 
Zuckerman, 2004), and prior convictions present an 
opportunity for people to demonstrate their understanding of 
this logical distinction. On the other hand probability may 
be able to describe how people might interpret a prior 
conviction as a meaningful coincidence, and thus be unable 
to exclude this meaningful coincidence from their reasoning 
(see Griffiths & Tenenbaum, in press). 
Experiment 1
The purpose of this experiment was to examine how people 
reason with prior convictions as evidence in criminal cases.
A case scenario was created from information of a real life 
case in which a child died, and the man responsible had 
similar prior convictions. 
Method
Participants Fifty-four people took part. There were eight 
men and forty-six women. Their mean age was 20.5 years 
and their ages ranged from nineteen to thirty-three years. 
They took part on a voluntary basis and were recruited from 
the University of Southampton campus. 
Materials A short scenario was adapted from a real life case 
in which an eighteen month old girl was killed by a man 
who had two similar prior convictions. The names in the 
scenario were changed to protect the identities of the victim 
and offender. The consent and debriefing underwent 
meticulous ethical reviewing with the sensitivity of the 
study being flagged in the initial person-to-person 
description and on the consent form on which options to 
withdraw were clearly stated. The debriefing contained 
hand-out information with contact details of the principal 
investigator and relevant organisations.
Participants were asked to consider the following 
scenario:
On January 2, 2006, David Baxter had been arrested. He 
had been accused of killing eighteen month old Joanna 
Connolly. Joanna’s skull had been fractured when she 
received a physical blow to the head. Joanna was the 
daughter of Susan Connolly, the woman David Baxter had 
been seeing.
Design and Procedure A 3 x 1 between-subjects design 
was used in this experiment. This experiment simply 
examined the effects of considering prior convictions as 
evidence. The three conditions included: a control condition 
in which no evidence of prior convictions was given to 
participants; an experimental condition in which evidence of 
one prior conviction was given to participants; and an 
experimental condition in which evidence of two prior 
convictions was given to participants.
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions and 
they first read the above scenario about Joanna Connolly. In 
the experimental conditions participants were given 
evidence of prior convictions in the following format (in the 
control condition they did not receive this sentence and in 
the experimental condition with two prior convictions they 
received an identical sentence with an earlier date):
David Baxter had previously served a three year sentence 
for being physically abusive towards an ex-girlfriend’s 
three year old in 2002.
Participants then had to answer two sorts of questions that 
have become a standard format in trying to capture logical 
or probabilistic reasoning in psychological research on 
reasoning (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). One of the 
questions asked for a categorical response to capture logical 
reasoning. Participants were given the options of ‘guilty’ 
and ‘not guilty’. Participants were also given a categorical 
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response to capture probabilistic reasoning by giving the 
option ‘cannot decide’. 
See this format below:
Please tick whether you think 
David Baxter is ‘guilty’__ 
David Baxter is ‘not guilty’__
‘You cannot decide’ __
The other question asked participants to record a rating 
response on a scale of 1 to 10. This scale was used to 
capture probabilistic reasoning if it was taking place. 
Participants were given values on a continuum between the 
absolute certainty of ‘guilty’ and the absolute certainty of 
‘not guilty’. The scale could also capture logical reasoning 
by making the options ‘guilty’ and ‘not guilty’ explicit:
On a scale of 1 to 10, circle the number that best reflects 
how guilty you think David Baxter is (0 represents Not 
Guilty; 10 represents Guilty):
Not      |__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__| Guilty
Guilty  0  1  2   3   4   5  6   7   8   9   10
The experiment lasted six minutes on average.
Results
The results showed that participants chose the response 
‘cannot decide’ (89%) significantly more often than the 
responses ‘guilty’ (9%) and ‘not guilty’ (2%) regardless of 
how many prior convictions they considered (chi2 = 
75.44(2), p <.0005). There are three possible implications of 
this result. First, participants demonstrate that they do not 
tend to endorse the legal logical distinction by concluding 
‘not guilty’ when there is no conclusive evidence to convict. 
Yet their responses may indicate that they do have some 
understanding that similar prior convictions, even when two 
are present, cannot be held as conclusive evidence to 
convict. Second, the endorsement of an uncertain response 
such as ‘cannot decide’ rather than ‘not guilty’ or ‘guilty’ 
may indicate that people are reasoning probabilistically and 
not logically about criminal evidence. 
But there is a third possibility; the result could also lead to 
the interpretation that people may not understand the 
materials. This possibility does not hold as the underlying 
ratings of guilt show that people’s reasoning is affected by
prior convictions, as Table 2 shows:











The underlying mean rating of guilt was higher when a prior 
conviction was present (Mean rank = 5.86 and Mean rank = 
6.33, for one and two prior convictions respectively) than 
when it was absent (Mean rank = 3.35, Kruskal-Wallis chi2
= 16.162 (2), p <. 0005). The result that people’s underlying 
ratings of guilt increase according to the number of 
disclosed prior convictions tends to suggest that people are 
reasoning probabilistically.
Experiment 2
The aim of this experiment is to extend reasoning about 
prior convictions to contexts in which people must also 
consider forensic evidence. This experiment examines 
whether forensic evidence is reasoned about in a biased way 
subsequent to the disclosure of a prior conviction.
Method
Participants Seventy-two people took part. There were 
twenty-four men and forty-eight women. Their mean age 
was 22.4 years and their ages ranged from eighteen to fifty-
three. Participants were given the choice of accepting £4 for 
taking part, and they were recruited from the University of 
Southampton campus.
Materials The Joanna Connolly scenario and the 
information about David Baxter’s prior conviction from 
Experiment 1 were used in this study. The consent and 
debriefing underwent meticulous ethical reviewing, with the 
sensitivity of the study being flagged in the initial person-to-
person description and on the consent form on which
options to withdraw were clearly stated. The debriefing 
contained hand-out information with contact details of the 
principal investigator and relevant organizations.
Design and Procedure A 2 x 3 between-subjects design 
was used in this experiment. The first between-subjects
factor was presence of prior conviction (evidence of one 
prior conviction or no evidence of one prior conviction). 
The second between-subjects factor was forensic evidence 
related to handedness of the perpetrator (evidence that the 
perpetrator was right-handed, or evidence that the 
perpetrator was left-handed, or no evidence of handedness).  
The six conditions were: control (no evidence of prior 
convictions or forensic evidence related to handedness); 
evidence of right-handedness, evidence of left-handedness; 
one prior conviction and no evidence of handedness; one 
prior conviction and evidence of right-handedness; one prior 
conviction and evidence of left-handedness.
Handedness was used because it presents: (i) an objective 
measure to compare people’s subjective underlying ratings 
of guilt (left-handedness occurs in approximately 10% of 
the population and right-handedness occurs in 
approximately 90% of the population), and (ii) a measure to 
facilitate an examination of whether people’s reasoning
about rarity is biased, subsequent to the disclosure of 
evidence of prior convictions. (Note also that twelve people 
were randomly assigned to the six conditions to aid 
potential comparisons with a jury). 
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In the forensic evidence conditions people were given a 
sentence related to handedness in one of the following 
formats:
Forensic evidence showed that the blow was delivered by 
a left-handed person. David Baxter is left-handed. 
Or
Forensic evidence showed that the blow was delivered by 
a right-handed person. David Baxter is right-handed.
Participants answered the same two categorical and scale 
questions as in Experiment 1 in each of the six conditions.
Results
The results showed that people chose the conclusion ‘cannot 
decide’ (78%) significantly more often than the ‘guilty’ 
(16%) or ‘not guilty’ conclusions (6%, chi2 = 65.333(2), p < 
.0005), as Table 3 shows below. This result suggests that 
people can reason towards uncertain conclusions, perhaps 
indicating a preference for probabilistic reasoning in this 
case. Table 3 shows the number of people who endorsed 
each sort of conclusion per condition (where: C = control; 
RH = right-handed evidence only; LH = left-handed 
evidence only; PC = prior conviction evidence only; PCRH 
= prior conviction and right-handed evidence; and PCLH = 
prior conviction and left-handed evidence). For this 
preliminary analysis it may be instructive to focus on the 
number of people out of twelve, perhaps akin to analyzing a 
jury’s choices, who chose each conclusion (i.e., Cowley, 
2007, in preparation). 
Table 3: The number of people who endorsed each 
conclusion per condition







10 11 11 8 9 7 56
Guilty 1 1 1 3 1 5 12
Not 
Guilty
1 0 0 1 2 0 4
Total 12 12 12 12 12 12 72
The results show also that people chose ‘cannot decide’ 
significantly more often than ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’ in every 
case except when they consider evidence of a prior 
conviction and left-handedness, as Table 3 shows. For 
example, when people consider evidence of right-
handedness or left-handedness, in the absence of a prior 
conviction, they endorse ‘cannot decide’ more often than 
‘guilty’ and ‘not guilty’ to the same degree (92% ‘cannot 
decide’ and 8% ‘guilty’ respectively), (chi2 = 8.33(1), p <. 
005). When people consider evidence of one prior 
conviction they endorse ‘cannot decide’ (67%) significantly 
more often than ‘guilty’ (25%) and ‘not guilty’ (8%, chi2 = 
6.5 (2), p <. 05). Likewise when people consider evidence 
of one prior conviction and right-handedness they endorse 
‘cannot decide’ (75%) significantly more often than ‘guilty’ 
(8%) and not guilty (17%, chi2 = 9.5(2), p <.01). These 
results suggest that people can reason towards uncertain 
conclusions, and that this pattern of results may be 
indicative of probabilistic reasoning. The conclusion ‘cannot 
decide’ can be considered rational in light of the fact that the 
evidence presented cannot prove guilt beyond doubt.
For example, when there is evidence of left-handedness 
there is a chance that David Baxter belongs to 10% of the 
population who are not guilty, and his prior conviction may 
be a mere coincidence. But when people consider evidence 
of one prior conviction and left-handedness, they begin to 
endorse ‘guilty’ (42%) almost as often as ‘cannot decide’ 
(58%),  and they tend to ignore the ‘not guilty’ conclusion
(0%, chi2 = .333 (1), p > .05), as the emboldened column in 
Table 3 shows. Why do people now begin to endorse 
‘guilty’ verdicts indicative of certainty? Perhaps because 
they consider evidence showing a connection between the 
victim and defendant which is stronger than chance. Thus 
the suggestion that their reasoning can be biased by the 
consideration of a prior conviction is supported. Further 
support for this suggestion comes from an examination of
people’s mean underlying ratings of guilt, which were 
higher when a prior conviction was present (Mean rank = 
6.22) than not (Mean rank = 4.8, chi2 = 12.28 (5), p < .05). 
The results show that people’s reasoning about forensic 
evidence can be biased, subsequent to the disclosure of prior 
conviction evidence.  
Conclusions and Current Directions
This paper intended to investigate whether theoretical 
frameworks of logic and probability, broadly construed, 
could explain how people reason in the real world. The 
context of reasoning about prior convictions as evidence in 
criminal cases made it possible to examine if such real 
world applications could inform the debate about whether 
logical or probabilistic frameworks are better for 
understanding human cognition. Experiment 1 showed that 
people’s underlying ratings of guilt increased with the 
number of prior convictions disclosed, while the surface 
conclusions represented the uncertain ‘cannot decide’.  
Experiment 2 showed that people’s reasoning was biased 
when they reasoned about forensic evidence subsequent to 
the disclosure of a prior conviction. Probabilistic 
frameworks tend to predict that the consideration of prior 
instances influence the interpretation of subsequent 
evidence (e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 2003). The results tend 
to support the suggestion that people may reason 
probabilistically towards uncertain conclusions, and that 
they may also reason probabilistically towards logical 
conclusions of which they are certain. 
The results have broader implications for probabilistic 
frameworks of reasoning by suggesting that (i) we need to 
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apply theories of reasoning to real world contexts of 
uncertainty more often (e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 2003), and 
(ii) we need to understand the circumstances under which 
mere coincidences turn into meaningful probabilistic 
evidence (see Griffiths & Tenenbaum, in press). 
Presently content analyses are being carried out to 
understand the reasons why people endorse the conclusions 
that they do in these experiments. For example, do people 
mention anything about ‘rarity’ when they reason about left-
handedness? Further experiments are being carried out to 
examine how people reason about similar and dissimilar 
prior convictions in group contexts.
The tentative suggestion that people reason 
probabilistically towards logical conclusions may have 
broader implications for cognitive science. Future work on 
how probabilistic reasoning with uncertainty leads to 
reasoning towards certainty may inform key debates of 
cognitive science. For example, the question of whether
computational levels of explanation, concerned with how 
people reason with logical representations (e.g., Johnson-
Laird, 1999) and symbols (e.g., Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988),
are more or less appropriate than connectionist levels of 
explanation, concerned with how people acquire knowledge
at the probabilistic neural network level (e.g., McClelland & 
Rumelhart, 1986).
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